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Products Liability: Defenses Based on
Plaintiff's Conduct
By David G. Epstein·*
!.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seen dramatic developments in the law of products
liability.1 There has been liberalization of the exclusive control requirement
of res ipsa Ioquitur, 2 Iegislative 3 and judicial 4 relaxation of the privity require-

* B.A., L.L.B., University of Texas.

Member of the Arizona Bar.
There is no reason for believing other than that the revolutionary developments
in the area of products liability will continue to "proceed apace." Accordingly, it
should be noted that the research for this paper was completed on April 12, 1968.
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three universally recognized requisites:
(1) The accident must be of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence;
(2) the accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant;
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the plaintiff.
See generally Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Extent To Which Plaintiff May Establish Negligence, 42 ST. JoHNS L. R.Ev. 410 (1968).
If the requirement of exclusive control were to be strictly applied, res ipsa loquitur
would rarely be available in a products liability case; for in most such cases at the
time of the accident the product is entirely within the plaintiff's control. Accordingly,
"exclusive control" has been liberally construed. In cases involving products coming
in sealed containers, the condition is satisfied by showing that there has been no change
in the product from the time the defendant relinquished control to the time of the
accident. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436,
438 (1944); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967) (dictum). In Illinois, possession or control of the injuring instrumentality
intervening between that of the manufacturer and the occurrence of the injury does
not preclude the application of res ipsa loquitur unless the length or character of the
intervening control indicates that the defect probably did not exist when the manufacturer parted with control. May v. Columbian Rope Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 27173, 189 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1963) (dictum).
3
Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code dispenses with the privity requirement to a limited extent. The section extends the seller's liability to persons in the
buyer's family or household and to guests in his home who are injured because of
breach of a warranty. See also Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Comment, UCC Section 2-318: Effect on Washington
Requirements of Privity in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. R.Ev. 253 (1966).
There is considerable controversy as to whether the privity reform effected by the Code
is sufficient. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Wis. 1967); FACT FINDING
Co?>U>!. ON JUDICIARY, SENATE OF THE STATE OF CALIF., SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1: THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE 457 (1961). But cf.
Bailey, Sales Warranties, Products Liability and the UCC: A Lab Analysis of the
Cases, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 291, 315-23 (1967). Accordingly, a number of states have
altered the language of section 2-318 or enacted additional statutory provisions to
eliminate further the privity requirement. See generally Emroch, Statutory Elimination
of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. R.Ev. 982 (1962); Note,
Caveat Venditor-Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 KAN. L. R.Ev. 285 (1968).
4
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111N.E.1050 (1916), eliminated
the privity requirement in a negligence action involving an instrumentality known to
be dangerous if defective. Today, in every jurisdiction, the privity requirement has
been abolished for all negligence actions. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100-03 (1960). At the time
of Prosser's article, Mississippi still required privity in negligence actions; this was
1
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ment, and creation of a new theory of recovery - strict liability in tort. 5 Consequently, many jurisdictions now offer three theories of recovery to persons
injured through use of a defective product: negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability in tort. Although the recent products liability developments
have been extensively treated both by courts and by commentators, numerous
problems remain. 6 One of the most pressing problems is the availability of
defenses based on the conduct of the plaintiff.

II.

POSSIBLE DEFENSES

In a products liability context, three basic categories of plaintiff conduct
might constitute defenses to an action for personal injuries sustained through
use of a defective product:
( 1) negligent failure to discover the defective condition;
(2) use of the product after discovery of the defect;
( 3) use of the product in a manner that could not reasonably have been
foreseen by the manufacturer.

Contributory negligence, as it is generally defined,1 is sufficiently broad to
encompass all three categories. Accordingly, there are products liability cases
that speak of failure to discover the product's defective condition as constituting contributory negligence; 8 others that so categorize use of the product
changed in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912 ( 1967).
In warranty, the privity requirement was first abolished in cases where the product
involved was either a food stuff or a drug. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75
Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). It was not until 1960, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), that the requirement was abolished
in a non-food or drug case. After Henningsen, other courts took similar action in what
Dean Prosser has described as the "most spectacular overturn of an established rule in
the entire history of torts." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 794 (1966).
For a more detailed treatment of the history of the abolition of the privity requirement see Lambert, Storming of the Citadel: Waning of the Privity Rule in Implied
Warranty Cases, 1963 PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 533.
• There is some controversy as to whether strict liability in tort is a "new theory of
recovery." Recently, in Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 229 N.E.2d 684
(Ill. Ct. App. 1967), the court said: "We have ... discovered scholarly authority that
the strict liability theory is essentially the liability of implied warranty divested of the
contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer and notice." 229 N.E.2d at 693. There is
also "scholarly authority" to the contrary. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d
853, 855-56 ( 1966) (dissenting opinion); Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 ( 1965). Strict
liability in tort has been described as "the most radical and spectacular development
in tort law during this century." American Law Institute Meeting, 32 U.S.L.W. 2623,
2627 (1964).
6
See Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?, 40 TuL. L. REV. 715
( 1966).
7
The Restatement definition of contributory negligence is as follows:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 463 (1965).
8
See, e.g., Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1962); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965).
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after discovery of the defect; 9 and still others that use "contributory negligence" to mean that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
injuries.10 These disparate definitions of "contributory negligence" are largely
responsible for the confusion that exists in products liability cases concerning
the availability of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct.
For example, in Kassouf v. Lee Brothers, Incorporated,11 plaintiff brought
a breach of implied warranty action against the seller and manufacturer of a
chocolate bar. While reading one evening, the plaintiff took a candy bar from
her dinner table and, without looking, opened the wrapper and extracted the
bar. She immediately noticed that the candy didn't taste "just right," but
she thought that it was because she had not eaten all day. About one-third
of the way through the candy bar, she bit into a "mushy'' worm. Needless to
say, plaintiff became extremely ill. Defendant argued that she was guilty of
contributory negligence. Using the term "contributory negligence" to mean
failure to discover the danger in the product or to take precaution against its
possible existence, the court held that contributory negligence is no defense
in a breach of implied warranty suit, saying: "Contributory negligence, in
general, is a defense only to actions grounded on negligence." 12 The case of
Nelson v. Anderson 13 similarly involved an alleged breach of implied war1
ranty. The plaintiff had continued to use an oil burner that he knew was not ,
functioning properly and was injured when the burner exploded. The court, 1
using the term "contributory negligence" to mean use after discovery of the
defect, held: "The weight of authority and sound reason support the view
that, in an action based on breach of implied warranty, contributory negligence of the buyer is a good defense ...." 14 From the language of the holdings in these two cases a casual reader would probably conclude that the two
cases are irreconcilable. Yet this is not necessarily true. The Kassouf court
might hold that use after discovery of a defect is a defense; the Nelson court
might find that negligent failure to discover a defective condition is not a
defense. These two cases cle~rly illustrate that a distinct and more definite
terminology is needed to describe the plaintiff's conduct in a products liability action.
There is a bit of Lewis G. Carroll's Humpty Dumpty15 in each of us.
Everyone - especially appellate court judges and contributors to legal periodicals - has the tendency to arbitrarily define terms. Succumbing to the
•See, e.g., Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d
786 (1963) (drinking coke after should have discovered broken glass in bottle); cf.
Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (use of
cleaning agent in close quarters after reading label warning against such use).
'"See, e.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962)
(wearing nightgown to smoke); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505,
127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (improperly opening bottle).
11
209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 ( 1962).
"' 26 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
13
245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955).
",72 N.W.2d at 865.
1.0 " 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means
just what I want it to mean - neither more nor less.' " L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLAss, ch. 6.
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"Hwnpty-Dumpty Syndrome," I propose the following labeling system for
use in this article:
( 1) Negligent failure to discover the defect will be referred to as "contributory negligence";
(2) use of the product after discovery will be called "asswnption of the
risk" ; 16 and
(3) use of the product in a manner that could not have been reasonably
foreseen by the manufacturer will be termed "misuse."

This terminology is not in itself significant; the labels merely reflect the language most widely used by the courts and legal writers. The use of three
separate terms is significant, however, since in products liability cases it is
necessary to distinguish the term "contributory negligence."

III.

NEGLIGENCE

The basic elements of negligence in a products liability case are the same
as those in any tort litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate
or legal cause, and damages.17 It is only logical that the same defenses are
available; as a matter of legal theory, therefore, both contributory negligence18 and asswnption of the risk1 9 are defenses to a products liability claim
based on negligence.
As a practical matter, however, contributory negligence is rarely a complete defense in any negligence matter. 20 Generally, the issue of contributory
negligence is factual2 1 and one for jury determination. Jurors, however, are
likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff - especially in the usual products
liability situation in which an individual who has suffered personal injuries
attempts to recover from a major manufacturing concern. 22
16
In a number of jurisdictions, the term "assumption of risk" has been used to designate a specific doctrine applicable to definite contractual relationships such as master
and servant. See generally Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 111
( 1964). Here "assumption of risk" is being used to describe a person's actions.
11
See generally P. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 ( 1965); Witherspoon, Manufacturer's Negligence in Products
Liability Cases, 5 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 585 (1964).
18
"[T]here is little if anything truly distinctive to products liability cases in so far as
the issue of contributory negligence is concerned ...." 1 R. HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2: 121 ( 1961).
1
• Id. at 2:124.
20
See Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 412 (1963).
21
There are, of course, instances even in a products liability case where the plaintiff
is found to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See 1 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 13.01, at 346.1 (1967).
22
For example, in Independent Nail and Packing Co. v. Mitchell, 343 F.2d 819
(1st Cir. 1965), the plaintiff was injured when a portion of a pole barn nail he struck
with a hammer broke off and hit him in the eye, destroying all vision in that eye.
Plaintiff had been using pole barn nails for the five or six days prior to the injury.
When he was hammering the nails into the softer wood of the poles, about three per
cent would break off an inch from the head. The free part of the nail would then
"zing" through the air. When hammering the nails into the harder green oak siding,
about five percent would break. Despite the high incidence of "flying nails," plaintiff
did not wear safety glasses. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer, alleging negligence.
Defendant asserted the defense of contributory negligence, but the jury found for the
plaintiff, in the sum of $40,209.75.
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In a products liability case, the manufacturer's negligence may take such
forms as improper design, 23 negligent construction or assembly, 24 or failure
to adequately warn the users of all attendant dangers. 25 With regard to this
last category there has been considerable conflict concerning the applicability
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In a widely cited law
review article, Dean Hardy Dillard of the University of Virginia School of
Law and Harris Hart of the Virginia Bar state:
To allow these defenses - contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk - is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff
cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or to
have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably
ascertaining that the danger of injury existed. 26
Several reported cases take this position. 27 However, the authors of the two
leading treatises in the area of products liability espouse the view that contributory negligence may be a defense in some cases. 28 As even Dillard and
Hart concede,29 supporting cases can be found. 30 In most of this latter group
of cases, however, while the courts speak in terms of contributory negligence,
recovery was actually denied because ( 1) the warning was adequate, or (2)
inadequacy of the warning was not the cause in fact of the injury complained
of. Swift & Company v. Phillips 31 is a notable example.32
The plaintiff in Swift & Company had on numerous occasions used the
"amine type" weed killer manufactured by defendant; he was sold the "ester
type" manufactured by defendant and told that it was the same type weed
killer he had been purchasing. Without reading any of the printing on the
23
See, e.g., Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737
(1962). See also Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 645 (1967).
"See, e.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235
P.2d 857 (1951); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 6 (1967).
""See, e.g., Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951);
Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 68 PRODS. LIABILITY R.l'TR. para. 5890 (Mo. 1968); Noel,
Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings,
19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); Note, The Manufacturer's Duty To Warn of Dangers Involved
in Use of a Product, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 206.
""Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn,
41 VA. L. REv. 145, 163 (1955) •
.. E.g., McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712,
725 (1953).
"'See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8.06, at 169 (1967);
1 R. HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 2.52, at 231 (1961).
""See Dillard & Hart, supra note 26.
"'See, e.g., Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603 {6th Cir.
1965); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 72-74 ( 1961).
31
314 S.W.2d 326 {Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
= The question in Swift was whether the trial court properly declared a Inistrial on
the ground that the jury's answers to the special issues were in irreconcilable conflict.
The jury found (1) the manufacturer was negligent in failing to have adequate infor·
:mation on the container of the product in question; (2) this was a proximate cause
of the injuries complained of; (3) the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing
to read all of the printed :material on the can; ( 4) this was also a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. The court held that the jury's findings were not in conflict
and the defendant had a right to have the trial court render a judgment on the verdict.
For a thorough and understandable explanation of the special issue submission
practice in Texas, see G. HODGES, SPECIAL IssuE SuB11nssION IN TEXAS (1959).
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can, plaintiff used the weed killer and his crops were damaged. The court
reasoned that the directions on the can might have been inadequate, but that
had the plaintiff read them he would not have used the weed killer because
he would have discovered that it was not the same type that he had been
using. In a situation such as this - where the plaintiff has special knowledge
such that even a warning that fails to satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn
causes him to exercise "caution commensurate with the danger'' - it cannot
be said that the inadequacy of the warning was the cause in fact of the injury.
Cause in fact requires a "but for" relationship. This relationship does not
exist in cases like Swift & Company. In such cases recovery should be denied
because there is no causal relationship between the negligent failure to warn
and the injury alleged- not because the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
or assumed the risk.
Although numerous opinions 33 and law review writings 34 have considered
contributory negligence in a products liability context, relatively little has
appeared in print about assumption of the risk in a products case. 35 The
reported cases that do discuss the doctrine adhere to the recent trend in all
negligence cases to limit its availability to cases of subjective appreciation i.e., the plaintiff in fact realized the nature of the hazard created by the
defendant's negligence. While there has been some discussion of whether the
standard should be objective or subjective, this question is of limited practical
significance. Where it is not possible to establish that the plaintiff actually
realized the nature of the risk involved, but it can be shown that he should
have appreciated the danger, contributory negligence will bar recovery. 36
Although there is general agreement that in a negligence-based products
liability claim use of the product in a manner that could not have been
reasonably foreseen by the manufacturer precludes recovery, 37 there is widespread disagreement about the basis of the defense. The prevalent practice is
to treat misuse as an element of foreseeability 38 - i.e., a seller is liable for all
injuries which an ordinary prudent man so situated could have reasonably
foreseen. While some courts have taken a narrow view as to what constitutes
a normal use,39 most jurisdictions have held sellers to a duty to anticipate
33
See, e.g., Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 ( 1965); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales, Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
"'See, e.g., Weston, Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEv.-MAR.
L. REv. 424 ( 1963); Comment, Products Liability: For the Defense - Contributory
Fault, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464 (1966).
33
Perhaps the dearth of secondary material is due to the excellent article by Professor Robert Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA..bJ.U:v.
122 (1961). Writers (and, more important, law review editors) might wel~at
this pre-empts the area.
""See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 496A (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
:r. See, e.g., Neusus v. B.D. Sponholtz, 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966) (by implication); Westerberg v. School Dist., 148 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1967).
33
See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 15 (1967).
""See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine, 128 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1942); Schneider
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 266 F. Supp. 115 (D. Neb. 1967) (by implication). See also
Dale & Hilton, Use of the Product - When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 350,
361-63 (1967).
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some relatively unusual uses.4 ° For example, standing on a dressing table stool
which collapsed41 has been held to be a foreseeable use, and the foreseeability
of eating coffee has been held a question for the jury.42
Misuse has also been recognized in some jurisdictions as a separate affirmative defense.43 This theoretical dispute raises a problem of considerable
practical significance. If misuse is a separate affirmative defense, the burden
of proof is on the defendant; if misuse is an element of foreseeability, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. In the usual negligence action the burden
of proving foreseeability is on the plaintiff. There is no reason for a contrary
rule in a products liability action.
Inherent in all areas of the law is the policy of discouraging persons against
whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering avoidable losses
or from increasing the loss by continuing in their conduct.44 This basic concept, commonly referred to as the avoidable consequences limitation on
damages, operates to deny a plaintiff recovery for damages he could have
reasonably avoided 45 that are incurred subsequent to his discovery of the
defect. Thus, in Missouri Bag Company v. Chemical Delinting Company,4 6
the court denied a claim for losses caused by holes in seed bags where the
plaintiff had discovered the defects before he used the bags. In applying the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, the court stated:
A person seeking to recover damages caused by the purchase of defective
articles ... can only recover such damages as he could not have avoided
by the exercise of reasonable diligence; and he is required to make
reasonable effort to protect himself from loss.47
Although they do resemble one another, two basic distinctions belie the
similarities of the avoidable consequences doctrine and assumption of risk.
Assumption of risk negates liability and bars recovery in most jurisdictions,
whereas avoidable consequences does not affect the issue of liability and only
reduces the amount of recovery. Moreover, since assumption of risk is
an affirmative defense, it must be pleaded by the defendant; avoidable consequences goes to mitigation of damages and thus need not be pleaded.

IV.

WARRANTY

A. Common Law Warranty
Common law warranty has been variously described as "having its commencement in contract and its termination in tort" 48 and as "a curious
.. See, e.g., Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d
681, 691 (1964); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 825 (1966).
"See Nettles v. Forbes Motel, Inc., 182 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
""See Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932).
••See Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944);
cf. Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
.
.. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 918 ( 1939).
""See generally C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 33-42
( 1935).
""214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) .
., Id. at 76-77.
48
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
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hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the
law." 49 Suffice it to say, although today warranty is regarded as contractual
in nature, 50 it was originally an action sounding in tort and has not yet
entirely lost its original tort character. 51 Because of the historical development of warranty, 52 contractual defenses such as disclaimer and notice may
be properly urged in an action based on breach of warranty. 53
As the excerpts from Kassouf and Nelson 54 indicate, the availability of
defenses emanating from plaintiff's conduct in an implied warranty action is
a most confused matter. Although a number of cases espouse the Nelson
court's view that contributory negligence is a defense, 55 the majority of the
cases seem to be in agreement with Kassouf that it is not a defense. 56 Several
leading authorities in the products liability area have attempted to formulate
a classification by analyzing the broad assertions of law. They have concluded
that contributory negligence does not constitute a defense to breach of an
implied warranty and that assumption of the risk and misuse do bar recovery. 57 The authorities have recognized several different grounds upon which
courts might consider misuse to be a defense: (1) failure to prove the use
was within the scope of the warranty; 58 (2) failure to prove defective con49

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964).
Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 147 (1958).
51
W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 651-52.
""For a history of warranty, see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-22 (1943).
"'As Professor Gilmore observed, "Lawyers have a professionally inbred passion for
speculating on the 'true nature' of things." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 37.2 ( 1965). Accordingly, it must be acknowledged that contractual defenses such as disclaimer and notice are not actually "defenses based on
plaintiff's conduct." More accurately, they are defenses based on the lack of conduct
by the plaintiff. It is submitted, however, that the benefits of a complete discussion
of available defenses outweighs any logical inconsistency.
Because today in 49 states the availability of these defenses is governed by specific
Uniform Commercial Code provisions, discussion of them will be reserved for the subsection of the article by that title.
"'Notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
"'E.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (adopting
merely the trial court's determination that negligence is a defense) (Colorado law);
Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557, 562 (1964).
"'See, e.g., Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1963); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
Hursh states: "The weight - which is hardly a great weight - of authority appears
to be on the side of the view that negligence on the part of a user of a product is no
defense in a breach of warranty action ...." 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.9, at 416 (1961). See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01 (3) (1967). The authors equate the general duty of due
care with the inadvisability of requiring the consumer "to make any sort of detailed or
expert examination." Therefore, they conclude that only negligence, as "the equivalent of unreasonable exposure to a known and appreciated risk," should be a defense to
breach of implied warranty. See notes 57 and 121 infra.
"'See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and
Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 30 ( 1965); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers
and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207, 247-51 (1965); Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 21-22 (1965) (no discussion of
misuse); cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 656-57.
03
See, e.g., Magee v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322
(1963); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
ro See
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dition; 59 and (3) failure to prove causation. 60 Under any one of the three,
however, misuse is not a defense; rather, proper use is an essential element
of the plaintiff's case. This categorization accurately reflects the holdings of
the cases that have been reported to present date. The relevant cases fully
support the view that assumption of risk is a defense in an action based on
breach of warranty. 61 No reported case has held that contributory negligence,
as the term is defined in this article,62 is a defense in a warranty action. 63
The rationale generally advanced for rejecting the defense of contributory
negligence in warranty cases is that it is a tort defense, while warranty actions
are contractual in nature: Realistically, however, such an argument cannot
be the true reason for the rule., Assumption of risk is also a tort defense, yet
it operates to prevent recovery in a warranty actio:q.65

B. Uniform Commercial Code Warranty
At present, the Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in forty-nine
states. As the Code has grown in popularity, numerous legal writers have
suggested that products liability litigation based on contract be governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code instead of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 66
m See, e.g., Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964); Preston v.
Up-Right, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 2d 594, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966).
co Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr.
842, 845 (1966); Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co., 405 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966).
1
• See, e.g., Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d
786 (1963) (allowing the substantive defense, but disapproving a strict tort law application); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 ( 1966).
""See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
""In cases similar to Nelson, it is not possible to ascertain what the courts mean by
the term "contributory negligence." However, in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior
Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967), the court stated: "We think that the
defense of contributory negligence, or the related defense of assumption of risk, would
be applicable." Id. at 842 (emphasis added). The court went so far as to say that the
defense of causation "merges with the defense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk ...." Id. at 843. Prosser has found that a number of cases following Nelson
can be distinguished as actually being assumption of risk cases. W. PROSSER, supra note
49; see note 126 infra.
"'See, e.g., Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
One writer distinguished the applicable defenses on the basis of whether an express
or an implied warranty is in issue. Express warranty would obviously sound only in
contract, whereas implied warranty emanates from tort principles, although it originally
required contractual consent and prlvity. Therefore, contributory negligence would
only be an appropriate defense under the latter theory of recovery in tort. Bushnell,
Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REV. 412, 421-22 (1963).
cs The theoretical inconsistency in disallowing the defense of assumption of risk
in a breach of warranty action was clearly brought out in the recent case of Pritchard
v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), where the court
stated: "[A]ssumption of risk ... is available as a defense in an action for personal
injuries based on negligence. It follows as a matter of logic that the same defense
is apposite in an action based on breach of express warranty." Id. at 485. Yet on the
very same page the Pritchard court held that contributory negligence was not a defense
in an action for personal injuries based on breach of warranty.
ro See, e.g., Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 905 (1967); Shanker,
Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes, and Communication Barriers, 17 W.
RES. L. REv. 5 ( 1965); cf. Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases:
The Need for a Revised Third-Party-Beneficiary Theory in U.C.C. Warranty Actions,
52 VA. L. REV. 1028 (1966).
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The general products liability provision of the Code, section 2-314, imposes
liability on the seller of an unmerchantable product, under the theory of
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, for damages incurred
because of the product's defective condition. Subsection 2 ( c) of section
2-314 seemingly establishes that misuse of a product will bar recovery:
"Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used ...." This language indicates that
under the Code, as in negligence and in common law warranty, it is the
plaintiff's burden to prove that he made an "ordinary use" of the product,
and a Pennsylvania district court has ruled accordingly. 67
The Code affords an alternate theory of recovery- implied warranty of
fitness - that is applicable in a more limited number of cases.68 To prevail
under this theory, the plaintiff must establish that ( 1) the seller knew the
particular purpose for which the goods were required, (2) the buyer relied
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for this
purpose, and (3) the goods were not in fact suitable for this purpose. 69 By
the very nature of this remedy, plaintiff has a cause of action only where he
has used the product in the manner indicated to the seller; in other words,
misuse, as defined herein, is a defense.
There is also language in section 2-316 of the Code that bears on the
question of the availability of the defense of contributory negligence, as the
term is herein defined, in an action under the Code for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness:
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him ....
This seems to indicate that under the Code, negligent failure to discover a
defect from a presale inspection bars recovery; however, there is no reported
case so holding. A student writer in the Southwestern Law Journal seems to
take the position that under this provision failure to inspect or discover before
use gives rise to the defense of contributory negligence. 70 This is not what the
section provides; at most, it applies only to failure to inspect or discover
before the sale. There is no Code language relating to contributory negligence arising from an inspection taking place after the sale. Therefore, the
availability of contributory negligence in an action under the Uniform Commercial Code depends upon when the contributory negligence occurred; in
cases in which the buyer has examined or has refused to examine the goods,
assumption of ~sk is a defense.
"'Robert H. Carr & Sons, Inc. v. Yearsley, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 262 (1963) .
.. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 .
.. See generally DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IMPLIED
WARRANTIES 7-8 (1964).
1
° Comment, Strict Products Liability-Its Application and Meaning, 21 Sw. L.J.
629, 645 (1967).
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Disclaimer has been considered as a contractual form of assumption of the
risk.71 Since all warranties are subject to a disclaimer, 72 a manufacturer or
seller might, by means of a judiciously worded disclaimer, avoid liability for
injuries caused by negligent use or misuse of a product. Recently, however,
the enforcement of certain limitations on warranty have come under attack.~3
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Incorporated, 14 the buyer's wife sustained personal injuries when the steering mechanism of their new car failed.
In allowing a cause of action based on breach of implied warranty, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held the standard warranty disclaimer of the Automobile Manufacturers' Association unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
Speaking to the warranty limitation, the court stressed the "gross inequality
of bargaining position" 75 between a car buyer and a major automobile manufacturer. While the Henningsen decision has been well received by the commentators,76 judicial reaction has been mixed. Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Gompany 71 enforced the very same warranty disclaimer involved in Henningsen, and numerous other recent cases have upheld similar disclaimer
provisions.78
Clearly some warranty disclaimers should be unenforceable as a matter of
public policy. The average consumer is helpless when confronted with a
warranty disclaimer. Disclaimers often appear in small print on the back of
a standard form. Since the seller is usually without authority to vary the terms
of these clauses, the consumer who happens to notice the disclaimer will be
in no better position than one who did not. This is not to say that the courts
should nullify all disclaimers. To the contrary, reasonable guidelines for determining the enforceability of disclaimers are provided in relevant Uniform
Commercial Code sections. 79 Under the Code, a disclaimer of implied war71
See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 120,
136 (1961) .
.,.See, e.g., 77 C.J.S. Sales§ 317 (1952). See generally Prosser, The Implied Wa-rranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 157-67 (1943).
0
"'See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 71, at 135 & n.26; Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in
Consumer Sales, 77 lIARv. L. REv. 318 (1963).
"32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
•• 161 A.2d at 87.
0
•a See, e.g., 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 ( 1963) ; Philo, Automobile Products
Liability Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 181, 185-87 (1966); Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 832-33
(1966). But cf. Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and
Warranties, 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1963) (rejecting disparity of
bargaining power as a basis for the decision).
"207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1967). The Marshall court refused to follow
the New Jersey precedent on the ground that rejection of the disclaimer would run
counter to established freedom of contract principles in automotive dealings. Moreover,
since the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by Virginia in 1964, provided specifically
for exclusion of an implied warranty of fitness in § 2-316, the court reasoned that the
legislature did not endorse the considerations of public policy underlying Henningsen.
Id. at 144-45.
••see, e.g., Brown v. Chrysler Corp., 112 Ga. App. 22, 143 S.E.2d 575 (1965)
(defect did not cause personal injury); DeGrendele Motors, Inc. v. Reeder, 382 S.W.2d
431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (opinion expressly limited to cases not involving personal
injury); Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 137 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1964).
70
See generally 1 w. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM
Co111111ERCIAL CODE§ 1.190303-04, at 75-85 (1964).
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ranty must be conspicuous 80 and must not be unconscionable.81 While it is
difficult to predict what disclaimers the courts will hold unconscionable, it
seems unlikely that unconscionability will attach to a disclaimer absolving
the manufacturer from responsibility for losses incurred through the user's
lack of care or bizarre use of a product.
Section 2-607 ( 3) (a) of the Code provides that where "a tender has been
accepted ... the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred
from any remedy." 82 On its face, this section does not require that notice be
given by parties who are not buyers, but who are entiled to recover under
section 2-318; the comments accompanying the section, however, make it
clear that notice must be given by such parties.83 Since the Code is neutral
as to whether warranty extends beyond the buyer, his family, household, and
guests, these official cements are of limited importance. The question remains
whether persons not within the scope of section 2-318 must give notice in
order to recover under a breach of warranty theory. No Code cases consider
this question. There is, however, a line of Sales Act cases which indicate that
such persons will not be required to give notice.84 For example, in Ruderman
v. Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Company,85 the court reasoned that since
Uniform Sales Act warranty coverage was limited to instances in which the
parties were in privity, the Sales Act notice provision 86 had no application to
an action between the buyer and a manufacturer who was not the seller.

v.

STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT

Recognition of strict liability in tort as a theory supporting recovery for
personal injuries sustained through use of a defective product is a recent
development in the law of products liability. Until 1962, the only judicial
authority encouraging such a position was the concurring opinion of Justice
Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company.81 In 1963, Traynor reit80
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316. "Conspicuous" is defined as: "'Conspicuous': A term ... is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
1-201(10). See generally Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 226 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1967).
81
"Unconscionable" is not among the words defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code. There is, however, an excellent recent law review article that considers the
scope of the term. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code -The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
83
No particular form of notice is required by the statutory language of the Code;
nor does the Code contain any concrete guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable
time within which to give such notice. Comment 4 to section 2-607 indicates that less
stringent standards are to be used where the plaintiff is a retail consumer.
83
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-607, Comment 5.
"'See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 829-31 ( 1966).
85
23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (C.P. 1962).
80
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 49. See generally L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
SALES§ 95, at 460-62 (2d ed. 1959).
87
24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). Justice Traynor proposed: "[I]t
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id.
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erated his views in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorporated,88 and
his opinion received the unanimous approval of his fellow justices on the
court. In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood he was
turning on a retail-purchased lathe came loose and struck him on the head.
He brought an action in negligence and breach of warranty against both the
manufacturer and the seller of the machine. The plaintiff's expert witness
testified that the use of inadequately set screws to hold the parts of the
machine together caused the wood to fly out of the lathe. The manufacturer
appealed from the jury's judgment for the plaintiff, contending that the
plaintiff's failure to give timely notice of the alleged breach of warranty to
the manufacturer barred his recovery.89 The California Supreme Court
rejected this contention:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a
contract between them, the recognition that liability is not assumed by
agreement but imposed by law ... and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility ... make clear that
the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties, but
by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and
governing warranties ... cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturer's liability to those injured by their [sic] defective products ...." 90
In the six years since Greenman, the decision has been praised by casenote
writers 91 and legal commentators,92 numerous cases have taken a similar position,93 and the American Law Institute has adopted strict liability in tort in
the Restatement (Second} of Torts.94 These developments prompted Dean
Wade to say:
The trend for the future is clear.... It will soon become the established
rule in the United States that the manufacturer is subject to strict tort
liability without regard to the requirement of privity.... Gradually a
majority of the courts will slough off the warranty language and will be
ready to follow the lead of the Restatement and the California court in
frankly and accurately describing the liability as strict tort liability.95
SS 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
so The Code provides: "[T]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of the breach or be barred
from any remedy..•." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a). See generally
Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 151N.W.2d477 (Iowa 1967).
00
377 P.2d at 901.
01
See, e.g., 36 CoLo. L. REV. 303 (1964); 15 STAN. L. REv. 381 (1963); 16 VAND.
L. REv. 445 (1963).
rn See, e.g., Laschcr, supra note 5 7; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in
California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966).
03
See, e.g., Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966);
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1966). See generally Wade,
supra note 57, at 11-12.
91
RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement position,
however, is limited to "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property ...." Id. at§ 402A (1).
""Wade, supra note 57, at 25.
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Since most states that have adopted strict liability in tort have done so by
expressly adopting section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, 96 section
402A presents a logical starting point for determining the applicability in
strict liability tort cases of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct. 97 While
the section itself does not speak to the question, the accompanying comments
are pertinent. Comment n provides in part:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand
the form of contributory negligence, which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of the risk, is a defense under this
Section ....98
In addition, comment h provides:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal
handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling ... or from abnormal preparation for use ... the seller is not
liable.99
There are only four reported cases imposing strict liability in tort with express
holdings as to the availability of defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct.
Three are clearly consistent with the Restatement views. In Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Company v. Tunks,1° 0 the plaintiff's minor son had placed a stick
with a glowing coal on its end in the bed of a toy truck and then asked a
playmate to pour some kerosene upon the stick. The playmate did and an
explosion ensued. The explosion occurred because the kerosene had been
adulterated by the addition of gasoline after the product left the refinery and
while it was in the delivery process. 101 In rendering a plaintiff's verdict, the
jury found that the minor son was contributorily negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of his inquiries.102 On their application
for mandamus, defendants urged that absent a showing of privity of contract,
a cause of action could not lie and that the finding of contributory negligence
barred recovery under a theory of strict liability. The Texas Supreme Court
00
See, e.g., Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.
1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912 (1967). The Appendix to Restatement (Second) of Torts lists all but
the most recent of cases adopting strict liability in tort. Note, however, the Restatement
takes the position that cases eliminating the privity requirement in breach of warranty
actions are strict liability in tort cases.
97
The section is perhaps the most controversial in the Restatement. One attack is
that § 402A is a "radical change" from existing case law. See DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, BRIEF OPPOSING STRICT LIABILITY IN ToRT; Smyser, Products Liability
and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343
(1965). Another criticism is that, by excepting the manufacturer who does not market
an "unreasonably dangerous product," the section has, in fact, "adopted a rule very
similar to negligence." Note, Product Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 322-23 (1966); see note 94, supra.
08
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
09
Id., comment h at 551.
100
•H6 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
01
'
Id. at 780 n.1.
102
Id. at 781.
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acknowledged the definitional problems inherent in classifying a party's duties
under doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk and held
that "contributory negligence," when defined as "the failure to use ordinary
care,'"103 was not a defense.104 The court seemed to indicate, by way of dictum, that misuse, submitted under a proper formulation and not as a catchall theory of contributory negligence, might well have been argued in the case
at bar.1os
Under the Restatement rule which the Tunks court adopted,1° 6 a plea of
"contributory negligence," as such, is insufficient. A finding of contributory
negligence might reflect only that the plaintiff failed to exercise proper care
in discovering the defect at issue and the Restatement disallows mere lack of
reasonable care as a defense. Thus, under the Restatement, the defense attorney must particularize the plaintiff's conduct on which he relies to establish
contributory negligence.
-----In Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Company 107 the plaintiff
was injured when the machine he was operating had a bolt shear off, causing
an 800-pound weight to fall on his arm. Evidence was introduced at trial
that the plaintiff's employee altered the machine in a manner contrary to the
use sanctioned by the manufacturer and that the plaintiff knew of a recent
failure of a bolt and the falling of a weight. The California District Court of
Appeal held, inter alia, that plaintiff had failed to show that he was injured
while using the product consistently with its intended use.108 Moreover, had
the plaintiff's proposed instruction on strict liability been accepted, his knowledge of the defect and failure to exercise,reasonable care for his safety was a
defense to a recovery in strict liability~7" Similarly, in Ferraro v. Ford Motor
Company 110 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the defense of
assumption of risk was available in an action based on strict liability in tort.
The plaintiff in Ferraro was injured when the left front wheel of his new
dump truck locked while he was making a left-hand turn. Conduct from
which the jury might find that plaintiff knowingly assumed the risk was his
prior experience with similar failures of the truck.
The fourth case, Maiorino v. Weco Products Company,111 might violate
the Restatement classification scheme. In M aiorino, the plaintiff cut his wrist
while attempting to open a glass container holding a new toothbrush. He
proceeded against both the manufacturer and the retailer who raised the
defense of contributory negligence, and the jury adopted the defense theory.

l.

103

Id. at 782.
Id. at 784.
1
os Id. at 785.
100
Id. at 783-84 (by implication).
~43 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966).
1
{
"/S2 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The critical issue in Martinez was whether the employer's
uhsanctioned use was, in fact, the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and defendant manufacturer and bailor ultimately prevailed on the plaintiff's failure to prove
proximate causation "attributable to them."
1
"" Id.
110
423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 ( 1966).
111
45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
1

"'
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In affirming a judgment for the defendants, the New Jersey Supreme Court
said:
[W]e are of the view that where a plaintiff acts or fails to act as a
reasonably prudent man in connection with use of a warranted product
or one which comes into his hands under circumstances imposing strict
liability on the maker or vendor or lessor, and such conduct proximately
contributes to his injury, he cannot recover.... [T]he well known principle of contributory negligence in its broad sense is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all the variant notions expressed in the cited
cases .... A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of
his product. The reach of the doctrine of strict liability in tort in favor
of the consumer should not be extended so as to negate that expectation.112
While the first two quoted sentences of the above excerpt are extremely broad,
the last two indicate that the Maiorino court regards contributory negligence
as importing misuse (more than assumption of risk) and not a general standard of due care. 113 Several legal commentators have so interpreted Maiorino,114 although Dean Prosser concludes that the case involves assumption
of risk.115 Unfortunately, inadequate recitation of facts in Maiorino does not
permit any determination of which view is correct.
By way of dictum, four other courts have expressed opinions on the subject
of defenses. In Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company 116 an Indiana federal district court approved of the Restatement position. The Arizona Court
of Appeals in 0.S. Stapley Company v. Miller 111 stated: "[W]e have no difficulty in determining that contributory negligence is a defense in a strict tort
liability action." 118 Difficulty, however, does arise in determining what the
Arizona court meant by "contributory negligence." Was the court using contributory negligence in its general sense or as the term is used in this article
- more restrictively to designate conduct amounting to misuse or assumption
of risk? Indeed, the plaintiff's conduct in Miller - riding on the front deck
of a motor boat rather than in the passenger compartment - clearly established assumption of risk; there was, moreover, substantial evidence of misuse.
Even more confusing is the dictum of the Illinois Supreme Court in People
ex rel. General Motors Corporation v. Bua: 119
In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 617, 210 N.E.2d 182, this
court adopted the theory which imposes strict tort liability on the
112

214 A.2d at 20.
See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at§ 16A[5][f].
n• See Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and
Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1385 & n.198 ( 1966).
115
See Prosser, supra note 76, at 839 & n.254.
11
"237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
117
6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 ( 1967).
118
430 P.2d at 709. Interestingly enough, in a dissenting opinion, which opposed
the adoption of strict liability in tort by the other intermediate appellate court in
Arizona, the judge assigned as a reason for not adopting strict liability in tort the
unavailability of the defense of contributory negligence. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431P.2d108, 119 (1967).
11
• 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
113
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manufacturer. Under that theory, negligence need not be proved and
a plaintiff has only to prove that his injury or damages resulted from a
condition of the product, that the condition was an unusually dangerous
one, and that the condition existed at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control. However ... it is necessary to prove that the
plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety.120
The quoted language from Bua indicates that in order to recover for personal
injuries resulting from his using a defective product, the Illinois plaintiff must
affirmatively show lack of negligent failure to discover the defect; in other
wo~ds, the plaintiff, not the defendant, has the burden of proof on contributory negligence.
A recent Illinois Court of Appeals decision gives the following explanation
of Bua:
Contributory negligence in a products liability case may be properly an
issue, for while it is said that the plaintiff is not required to discover a
defect ... on the other hand, if he discovers a defect, or if the danger in
the use is known to him and he proceeds to use it he may be guilty of
contributory negligence.121
Arguably, then, Bua differs from the Restatement view only in terminology.
Both Bua and the Restatement say, in substance, that failure to discover a
defect is not a defense, but that use after discovery of a defect is. The Restatement labels this latter form of conduct "assumption of the 'risk,'' while Bua
treats use after discovery of a defect as contributory negligence.
Most recently, in Dippel v. Sciano,1 22 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after
adopting 402A strict liability in tort,1 23 added by way of dictum: "The
defense of contributory negligence is available to the seller. The plaintiff has
the duty to use ordinary care to protect himself from known or readily
apparent danger." 124 Language subsequent to this excerpt indicates that
perhaps this court uses the term "contributory negligence" to include what is
herein referred to as "misuse." 125

VI. EVALUATION OF DEFENSES
Negligence, beach of warranty, and strict liability in tort have basically the
same elements in a products liability context. None of the three theories
allows recovery against the manufacturer or seller unless:
( 1) the prqduct was defective;
(2) the defect existed at the time the manufacturer or seller relinquished
control; and
(3) the defect caused the injury.
120

226 N.E.2d at 15-16.
m Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684,
692 (1967). See generally 1 R. HURSH, supra note 56, ch. 1.
m 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967).
=Id. at 63.
:m Id.
= "Defenses among others that suggest themselves are that the product must be
reasonably used for the purpose for which it was intended; abuse or alteration of the
product may relieve or limit liability ...." Id. at 63-64.
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It is, therefore, difficult to see any logic in holding that X conduct is a defense
to an action brought by a plaintiff when he alleges negligence, but the same
conduct does not constitute a defense when the plaintiff pleads breach of
implied warranty or strict liability in tort. 126 Law governing assumption of
risk and misuse is the same regardless of the theory of recovery: the former is
an affirmative defense; the latter is an essential element of the plaintiff's case.
Negligent failure to discover the defect or danger, however, is treated differently: in a negligence action such conduct establishes a defense; where the
plaintiff proceeds under warranty or strict liability in tort, it does not.
Realistically, the determinative factor should not be the form of action
under which the plaintiff elects to proceed. The courts should, rather, consider the central issue - allocation of the risk.127 The layman's probable
inclination to hold the manufacturer liable for all losses on the theory that he
is better able to pay is simply not practical. Such reasoning ignores the
"economic facts of life." It is not the "deep-pocketed manufacturer" who
will bear the losses imposed upon him - rather, it is the public who will have
to pay as consumers. Thus, the real question is, in effect, What losses should
the public pay for and what losses should the injured party have to bear.
With this focus, it seems clear that both assumption of risk and misuse should
bar recovery. Negligent failure to discover the defect is more tenuous. A
large portion of mass-produced items is manufactured with quality as poor
as the market will support and yet is advertised by conscious misrepresentations as to their known quality. Misrepresentation of high quality about a
low-quality product lulls the consumer into unwarranted security in his purchase; and his failure to exercise caution in using a product is merely a manifestation of the consumer's reliance upon advertising. Justifiable reliance
should not bar a plaintiff from recovering for his personal injuries. The de
facto victimization of the consumer requires that contributory negligence
should not constitute a defense in an action for personal injuries incurred
through use of a defective product regardless of the theory under which the
plaintiff proceeds.

l!l6 Prosser equates implied warranty with strict liability in reconciling applicable
tort defenses; and, for this limited purpose, they are arguably indistinguishable. W.
PROSSER, supra note 49; see note 56 supra.
127
See Keeton, Recent Decisions and Developments in the Law of Products Liability,
32 lNs. CouNSEL J. 620 ( 1965) ; cf. Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 ( 1965); P. Keeton, Products Liability-Some
Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1966); Keeton,
Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554 ( 1961) ; Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 945 (1957); Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: The Need for a Revised Third-PartyBeneficiary Theory in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv. 1028, 1037-47 (1966).
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